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Abstract – In this work, a methodological study is made 
to analyze the specificities resulting from analyzing 
tourism destinations through commons and anti-
commons frameworks. Some studies have been made 
recently in the area of tourism considering these 
frameworks. Although interesting results have emerged, 
there is yet much work ahead. Some studies have 
considerable results, but the fundamentals in tourism 
literature require yet much work in order to develop 
additional models to provide new combinations of tools 
to the decision makers to enhance welfare standards for 
communities and high levels of sustainable development 
in tourism structures. A project is studied on this 
context which the consequent analysis of the regional 
implications. 
Keywords – Tourism, Tourism Destination, Commons, 
Anti-commons, Coordination Ammaia Project. 
1. Introduction 
Tourism became one of the most important activities 
for countries’ economies. Tourism problems are 
classically discussed with authors around the world 
bringing to the discussion eclectic aspects of tourism 
phenomena. Many improvements have brought new 
tourism models to the actual debate.  
The case of the commons and anti-commons theories 
applied to tourism can be included in these new 
developments emerged in literature. In Tourism 
Economics the discussion around commons and anti-
commons in tourism can be found recently for 
authors as Andergassen, Candela and Figini (2013), 
Candela, Figini and Scorcu (2006) or Álvarez-Albelo 
and Hernández-Martín (2009), for example. In fact, 
in some conditions, it is possible to find out the two 
problems faced, which have conflicting properties: 
the commons and the anti-commons, conducting the 
tourism for over-production and under-production, 
respectively. 
In this paper, commons and anti-commons are 
presented and a discussion over the tourism problems 
involving these theories is made, having Ammaia 
Golf Course - a project in Alto Alentejo (Portugal) - 
as a backdrop to analyze the implications in the 
involving area management. 
2. Commons and Anti-commons 
The discussion around the definition of property 
rights is classical. The types of property rights require 
that the limits of these concepts are consistently 
investigated. As stated in Coelho, Filipe and Ferreira 
(2009), ambiguous concepts blur analytical and 
policy prescription clarity. For the analysis of this 
subject and clarification of the conceptualization on 
this matter see Coelho, Filipe and Ferreira (2009).  
In property rights field, it is possible to define the 
actions that individuals can take in relation to other 
individuals regarding one object: if one individual 
has a right, someone else has the corresponding duty 
to match that  right. 
In common pool resources, there is an evident  
relationship  between the separation in the property 
rights and the economic  incentives, which has been 
studied in order to highlight the resulting implications 
and externalities. 
Coase (1960) stated that well-defined property rights 
could contribute to well understand and overcome the 
problems of externalities, particularly those related to 
the common pool resources (open and shared 
resources). 
The commons problems are discussed since the 
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middle of last century, involving the idea that 
commons problems reflect usually the 
overexploitation of resources. The “lack of property 
rights” implies that no one may exclude others to 
access to a given resource. The existence of many 
agents to use a given resource, in these conditions, 
causes an inefficient level for the resource use and 
causes a special motivation for agents over-using the 
resource. The real level of use for the resource will 
take place at a higher level compared with the 
optimal level for the society as a whole. A problem 
on the commons arises when the property rights are 
not clearly assigned and therefore private costs 
underestimate social costs, which results in over-
production.  
There are very diverse implications in the way that 
commons are managed. For instance, formal and 
informal cooperation between local government 
agencies in a region may lead to interesting solutions 
in terms of economic and ecological effects. Ostrom 
(1990) wrote that there is not a trap in the inflexible 
tragedies of the commons nor that people is free of 
moral responsibilities through the creation and 
support of incentives that facilitate the occurrence of 
results. There are rules and principles, community 
institutions and sometimes even partial property 
rights which may serve as engines of social effective 
arrangements to share common pool resources. Yet 
high transaction costs may imply that completely 
defining extensive property rights over common pool 
resources might probably be impossible. 
By its turn, anti-commons theory has appeared 
representing the idea of an excessive partition of 
property rights. This theory has appeared in the 80’s 
of last century, introduced by Michelman (1982). In 
the last years of the 20th Century several ideas about 
this new problem around property rights have 
emerged in which too many rights of exclusion and a 
reduced level of utilization of the resource are 
present. Many examples have been given in the areas 
of pharmaceutics, intellectual property, or natural 
resources,  for example.  
When Michelman (1982) presented the notion of 
“anti-commons”, he defined it as “a type of property 
in which everyone always has rights respecting the 
objects in the regime, and no one, consequently, is 
ever privileged to use any of them except as 
particularly authorized by others”. 
Considering the anti-commons conceptualizing, 
Buchanan and Yoon (2000) wrote that the anti-
commons concept helps to explain how and why 
potential economic value may disappear into the 
“black hole” of resources underutilization.  
The description of the “anti-commons” settings 
makes evidence of the lack of efficiency in several 
situations in which each one of several owners with 
property rights over a given resource has no effective 
rights to simply use the resource (and also, each one 
has the right to exclude other agents from its 
utilization) or to use it properly. 
If property rights are too dispersed and 
complementary factors owners are unable to come up 
with efficient agreements, a "tragedy of the anti-
commons" may happen (Heller, 1998 and Bergstrom, 
2010). 
Anti-commons tragedies conceptualization allow to 
join, in a unifying framework, a construction that 
reflects a set of coordination failures in very distinct 
areas, such as patents, telecommunications, eminent 
domain, tourism or bureaucracy, just to add some 
more cases to the supra mentioned anti-commons 
cases. Overcoming these failures may be difficult, 
often brutal, but solutions can be got, by 
understanding the problems and finding the solutions 
on the available set of strategies for agents, 
sometimes considering administrative solutions to 
overcome the problem. The ability for one person to 
veto a solution drastically increases the obstacles to 
get a solution. 
It is interesting to observe Vanneste et al (2006) 
opinion that anti-commons dilemmas seem to elicit 
more individualistic behavior than commons 
dilemmas and are more prone to underuse than 
commons dilemmas are to overuse. These authors 
suggest that “if commons leads to ‘tragedy’, anti-
commons may well lead to ‘disaster’” (see the case of 
aquaculture projects in Portugal in Filipe, Ferreira, 
and Coelho, 2011). 
3.  Tourism Destination 
In general, the theoretical developments in Tourism 
Economics are based on the systemic nature of 
tourism and on the big heterogeneity of the tourism 
activities. Tourism presupposes a strong net of 
relationships among the economic agents in a 
complex system of  interactions among local, 
regional and national levels of governmental 
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agencies, firms, tourists and residents. In this sense, 
tourist products necessarily include a set of 
heterogeneous and complementary goods and 
services, supplied by firms belonging to different 
industries which are mainly, but not exclusively, 
located in the tourist destination. 
Considering that the tourist destination is, in essence, 
a travel destination that gets the attention of a large 
numbers of tourists, visitors may come to visit these 
destinations to see historical sites, natural wonders, 
national buildings, etc. Some tourist attractions also 
include many activities and souvenirs that are often 
got on these destinations. 
As Leiper (1990) refers, cited in Andergassen, 
Candela and Figini (2013), from de researcher’s 
perspective the tourism destination embodies all the 
specific and problematic features of tourism, such as 
its systemic nature, in which, the “space” plays a 
fundamental role.  
In Leiper (2004), tourist destinations are defined as 
“places where travelers choose to stay awhile for 
leisure experiences, related to one or more features or 
characteristics of  the place – a perceived attraction of 
some sort”.  Derived from the concept of tourist 
destination, also the tourist destination region may be 
considered for analysis as a geographic concept. 
Considering that often the perspective of the 
definition may be depending on the scientific area of 
study, the tourism destination may, in fact, be 
understood, for example, as a product or a territory 
where visitors arrive to, or - as Cooper et al (2008) 
defend - a territorial system supplying tourism 
products to satisfy the complex demand needs of 
tourists. 
For this definition, Cooper et al (2008) have  
identified the following common features of the 
destination: 
 The destination is a “product” in itself, with 
an economic value; 
 Such economic good is perishable: 
seasonality, the overload of tourists over its 
carrying capacity, the unsustainable use of 
natural resources etc. can reduce its 
economic value, thus leading the destination 
out of the market.  
 In the destination, tourists and residents 
compete for a limited amount of available 
resources; 
 The variety of goods and services which 
compose the tourism product must be of the 
same quality to guarantee the economic 
success of the destination. 
Andergassen, Candela and Figini (2013) have pointed 
that: 
 tourism supply meets demand in the 
destination;  
 environmental and cultural resources, 
attractions and the hospitality industry are 
all located in the destination;  
 the demand for tourism is revealed in the 
destination; 
 tourism destination is the conceptual link 
between the complexity of the sector, the 
complementarity and substitutability of the 
many goods and services of which the 
tourism product consists, and the supply of 
available local resources. 
4. Commons and Anti-commons in 
Tourism 
To discuss the problem of commons and anti-
commons in tourism area it is necessary to bring to 
the debate several additional essential considerations 
about this issue.  
It is important to state firstly that – as mentioned 
before -  the boundaries of these concepts have been 
largely discussed last decades and much work is 
needed to enhance new developments considering the 
large implications of the property rights discussion in 
so many different studying areas, as it is the case of 
natural resources or tourism, for instance (see Filipe, 
2006; Filipe, Coelho and Ferreira, 2006a,b; Filipe, 
Coelho and Ferreira, 2007, analyzing this subject in 
the area of natural resources, or Álvarez-Albelo and 
Hernández-Martín (2009) for tourism, for example).  
Considering the specificities of the common pool 
resources and their particular inherent features of 
subtractability and nonexcludability, they appear as 
usually indivisible local or global resources whose 
boundaries are difficult to delineate (Berkes 1998). 
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Many resources that are used by tourists are freely 
available (the landscape and the territorial spaces in 
general). In consequence, they can be considered as 
common resources, as proposed by Hardin (1968); 
other resources can be developed by the destination 
country or region, as it is the case of sports events, 
cultural events, etc.  
For the tourism activities, it is possible to say that the 
resources are used in common by tourists, locals, and 
others. Usually it is difficult, even socially 
unacceptable, or physically impossible, to exclude 
any of these groups from using a given resource. In 
addition, consumption by one user may reduce the 
quantity of resources (of the same quality) available 
to others. This includes even those resources 
relatively abundant in supply, such as air, water, and 
scenery. The abandoned or the decaying structures, 
for example, are blots that spoil the area’s landscape. 
Also the congested and overcrowded streets and other 
facilities, especially in highly heterogeneous tourist 
places, diminish variously the value of the tourist 
experience. This discussion suggests that the tourism 
resources possess the two distinguishing 
characteristics of common pool resources 
(nonexcludability and subtractability / rivalry) in 
addition to being indivisible and with “fluid” 
boundaries (see Briassoulis, 2002). 
A central issue emerges to the debate related to the 
way how to manage the natural, built, and socio-
cultural resources of visited communities in order to 
meet the fundamental conditions of promoting the 
economic well-being, of preserving the natural and 
socio-cultural capital, of achieving intra-generational 
and intergenerational equity in the distribution of 
costs and benefits, of securing their self-sufficiency, 
and of satisfying the needs of tourists (Briassoulis, 
2002; Butler, 1991; Eber, 1992; Farell, 1992; Hunter, 
1997; Ko, 2001).  
As referred in Briassoulis (2002), focusing on the 
central feature of the problem, the supra mentioned 
resources are used, on the one hand, by tourists in 
common with other tourists and, on the other, by 
tourists and locals. As “common pool resources” their 
exploitation by one user reduces the amount (or 
quality) available for others, being the exclusion of 
additional users difficult or impossible (Bromley, 
1991; Ostrom, 1990). As a result, tourism resources 
experience the characteristic problems of common 
pool resources: overuse and lack of incentive for 
individuals to invest in maintaining or improving 
them (Healy, 1994). Once they are overexploited, 
however, the sustainability is difficult to meet; thus, 
sustainable tourism development may be severely 
threatened. 
Cerina (2007) considers also the existing relationship 
involving growth dynamics and environmental 
sustainability in a model in which tourism resources 
are considered common goods. A theoretical basis for 
the concept of sustainable tourism is also given.  
In what anti-commons concerns, Candela, Figini and 
Scorcu (2006, 2008) were the first in using the 
concept of anti-commons to analyze tourism markets. 
On their paper, the authors concluded that tourist 
product is composed by a bundle of different goods 
and services, complementing to each other in the 
tourist destination and, hence, the local tourist 
systems might solve a problem of production 
coordination. However, such a combination might not  
automatically develop, since tourist production 
presents an anti-common problem, the policy maker 
intervention is required, although a private 
intervention (i.e., tour operator) could solve the 
problem too, even if a profit distribution conflict 
arises. 
Within the destination, the tourism product is 
successful if the many firms offering single parts of 
the holiday are coordinated (Candela and Figini, 
2010). This statement results from the existing 
complementarity between the single items which 
compose the holiday1.  
Considering that each firm owns the right to accept or 
to refuse the tourist in the destination, a problem of 
rights management is involved here2. 
The assumption of a good on which many agents 
share the same property right defines the anti-
common.  
According to Candela and Figini (2010), a tragedy of 
anti-commons may be present in tourism, once three 
dimensions of the coordination problem may be taken 
into account on this area: the coordination in 
                                                          
1Lodging in a hotel is a complement good of the meal 
offered in the restaurant and, in general, of all the other 
goods offered by local firms. 
2For example, if the hotel refuses the accommodation, it 
would produce a negative externality on the restaurant, 
since tourists would not travel to the destination. See 
Candela and Figini (2010). 
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quantities, the coordination in quality and the 
coordination in prices: 
 Coordination in quantity: it simply means 
that the carrying capacity of one firm has to 
match with the carrying capacity of its 
complements, otherwise tourists would not 
gain the physical access to the destination. 
This involves, for the destination 
management, the right to plan the 
(sustainable) development of the territory in 
the long run, and the possibility to use 
pricing and booking strategies in the short 
run to counteract phenomena such as 
seasonality, overbooking etc. 
 Coordination in quality: if there is a luxury 
hotel in the destination its guests would 
probably ask for a luxury restaurant. If, 
instead, there is only a pizzeria, or a take-
away, tourists would probably not come to 
the destination at all. A complication arises 
when, at the same time, the destination hosts 
different types of tourism. In such case, the 
destination has to offer a range of different 
qualities (and varieties) in order to match the 
specific demands. 
 Coordination in prices: without coordination 
among firms, the final price paid by the 
tourist may be too high, the number of 
overnight stays too low and, as a 
consequence, profits of the firms are not 
maximized. So, without coordination, there 
will be a market failure stemming from the 
anti-common property. 
As referred in Álvarez-Albelo and Hernández-Martín 
(2009), Candela, Figini and Scorcu (2006, 2008) – 
when studying the local tourist systems - showed that 
when the complementary goods in tourism are 
produced under imperfect competition, the anti-
commons problem may emerge. This problem 
appears when there is no coordination among the 
firms in making their decisions. As a consequence, 
each industry charges its own mark-up, which leads 
to a higher package price and a smaller tourism 
production than if a unique mark-up were charged on 
the package price. 
Álvarez-Albelo and Hernández-Martín (2009) have 
studied countries with a high level of specialization in 
tourism, and basing their study on a set of premises 
they analyzed the effects of the commons and anti-
commons problems on the aggregate equilibrium of a 
tourism economy. They studied these market failures 
with consequences on factor allocation and welfare as 
much as the appropriate governmental measures to 
reach a suitable policy. In the case of the commons 
the authors consider a congestion problem (not a 
tragedy – not an exhaustion of the common resource 
due to overuse). It is interesting to note that several 
cases are analyzed, considering several working 
hypotheses (for the specific contextualization, see 
Álvarez-Albelo and Hernández-Martín, 2009). The 
first situation deals with direct selling wherein the 
local and the foreign firms make their decisions 
independently. In this case, it would become optimal 
to tax the local tourism price whenever the commons 
problem overcome the anti-commons problem. When 
the opposite applies, subsidizing would become 
optimal. With the emergence of tour-operators, 
according to the authors, based on the industrial 
organization literature, the joint maximization of 
profits would be a solution for the anti-commons 
problem, provided that a unique mark-up is charged 
(see Álvarez-Albelo and Hernández-Martín, 2009, 
considering Andreiychencko, Girnius and Saha, 2006 
analysis).  
In the tourism markets, tour-operators choose the 
package prices and productions that maximize the 
total surplus, and then the surplus is shared out 
between the tour-operators and the local firms 
through negotiation processes. According to Álvarez-
Albelo and Hernández-Martín (2009) from the firms’ 
point of view the joint maximisation of profits would 
be a solution for the anti-commons problem, but not 
from the perspective of the tourism economy because 
the maximization of the total surplus does not imply 
the maximization of profits earned by the tourism 
country. It is relevant to note that foreign tour-
operators and tourism destination do not have the 
same objectives, and consequently their views on the 
problems’ solution for commons and anti-commons 
necessarily differs considerably.  
In that situation, in the particular case of an economy 
specialized in tourism the commons problem may 
remain unsolved (congestion problem), and therefore, 
a public intervention is needed to reduce the tourism 
production. 
In this study, the authors conclude that: 
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 since the foreign transport services and the 
local tourism goods are complementary, 
they can be combined as a package, and 
hence the direct selling and the presence of 
foreign tour-operators emerge as 
possibilities;  
 in the direct selling situation the optimal 
policy depends on the relative importance of 
the problems;  
 the presence of either one or several tour-
operators does not solve the anti-commons 
problem provided, and it always leads to 
tourism over-production;  
 the existence of a unique tour-operator does 
not solve the congestion problem; 
 under sensible assumptions, the switch from 
several tour-operators to a single one turns 
to be welfare reducing; 
 the tour-operators seek to maximize profits 
and not welfare of the tourism destination; 
 the government at the destination should not 
leave the solution of these problems in the 
tour-operators’ hands; 
 the study is somehow limited once there are 
restrictive hypotheses in their theoretical 
framework (although they believe the main 
conclusions may prevail). 
Andergassen, Candela and Figini (2013), by their 
turn, model the optimal development strategy of a 
tourism destination3 by identifying and analyzing two 
key economic features:  
i) the long-term choice of whether to invest 
in the enhancing of natural and/or cultural resources 
(which act as common goods in the destination) or to 
increase the degree of sophistication of the tourism 
product (intended as the variety of complementary 
services to accommodation that are demanded by 
tourists);  
ii) the short-term choice of whether or not to 
implement price coordination among local firms, a 
                                                          
3 These authors make a classification of destinations based 
on the type of coordination and on whether the primary 
resource is natural, cultural or organizational. 
problem stemming from the anti-common nature of 
the tourism product.  
Their economic model for the tourism destination 
focuses on these specific aspects of the economics of 
tourism which have not been properly addressed by 
existing literature, i.e.  
i) the issue of coordination between local 
firms and  
ii) the degree of sophistication of the tourism 
product.  
The works of Andergassen and Candela (2012) on the 
issue of sophistication were extended and integrated 
in the Andergassen, Candela and Figini (2013) study, 
including the supply of a variety of different local 
goods and services that are also demanded and 
purchased by tourists during their stay, and also the 
works of Candela, Figini and Scorcu (2006, 2008) 
and Candela and Figini (2010), who addressed the 
issue of price coordination.  
Andergassen, Candela and Figini (2013) approach 
also follows Papatheodorou (2003), who was the first 
to formally analyze the issue of the complementarity 
and variety of services within the tourism product, 
and Wachsman (2006), the first to formally analyze 
the problem of price coordination within the 
destination (see also Alvarez-Albelo and Hernandez-
Martin, 2009).  
In Andergassen, Candela and Figini (2013), the 
authors generalized the problem of coordination, 
tackling the main limitations in the results of 
Wachsman (2006) and Candela, Figini and Scorcu 
(2006/2008) and jointly considered sophistication and 
coordination, thus building a unique economic model 
to describe the development and the organizational 
pattern for the tourism destination. 
This approach allows important implications for the 
economics of the destination, by highlighting 
important policy outcomes for destination 
management and local stakeholders. 
By comparing the solution of no coordination with 
those in the case of exogenous coordination through 
the destination management and endogenous 
coordination through the tour operator, the authors 
present the following: 
Theorem 1 (The Coordination Theorem). Given the 
anti-common property of the tourism product, 
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coordination among firms in the destination, which 
can either be provided by the destination 
management or by a tour operator, increases profits 
from tourism. 
Then, can be seen that price coordination enables the 
tourism activity in the destination to be more 
efficient. It can be noted that this is an example of the 
prisoner dilemma where (price) coordination yields a 
Pareto superior solution to non-coordination. 
Besides, a “Love for Variety Theorem” for the 
destination is presented by the authors, allowing 
tourism to “take-off” in the long run. Variety in the 
tourism product can then be a strategic asset: 
Theorem 2 (Love for Variety Theorem). As long as 
the negative externalities on tourism quality are 
small, reorganization of the tourism destination 
toward increasing the variety of available goods and 
services raises tourists’ welfare and their willingness 
to spend on tourism at the expense of non-tourism 
consumption, thereby stimulating the economic 
development of the destination. 
As a conclusion, the authors show that there are two 
key issues that have been identified in order to 
understand the rise, specialization, development and 
institutional arrangement of tourism destinations: 
i) the choice between investing in the variety 
of the tourism product (its sophistication) or 
enhancing local resources;  
ii) the coordination of local firms, stemming 
from the anti-common property of the tourism 
product. 
As can be noted, important developments have 
emerged to analyze the tourism destinations as a 
significant part of the tourism literature. This kind of 
approach to this theme is an important contribution to 
provide  a manageable tool to the decision makers in 
order to solve several kind of tourism dilemma when 
facing tourism management problems. The 
framework of commons and anti-commons allows to 
methodically organize possible solutions for a set of 
problems arising in the tourism area. 
5. The “Ammaia” Project in Marvão, 
Alentejo Region, Portugal 
5.1 Geographical and Historical 
Contextualization 
Northern Alentejo – Portalegre District – is a very 
preserved region. There are vast plains, mountains, 
thermal waters, dolmens and menhirs stones, manor 
houses, ancient convents, wineries, … There are also 
festival and fairs, popular music and dancing, local 
art. The region is intended to maintain tradition and, 
in general, it has been kept offside of all tourists 
paths and from tourism mass.  
Since prehistoric times this region has been sought by 
mankind. Over half a hundred dolmens and menhirs - 
of which that Meada (Castelo de Vide) is the biggest 
of the Iberian Peninsula - bear witness to the 
exuberance of the megalithic culture. The Romans 
were to surprise the natives in their fortifications. 
They built on the best lands of the valley and plains. 
The Roman town of Ammaia (Marvão) and the 
Roman villa of Torre de Palma (Monforte), with their 
beautiful mosaics retell a little of the splendours of 
the Empire. Following the Barbarians, the Moors left 
their indelible imprint on the language, the 
agriculture, the military architecture (Elvas, Marvão) 
that the Christians from the North were able to 
assimilate and transform into anchors of Portuguese 
nationality. The castles and town walls of the 
Northern Alentejo - which form the country's most 
important group of fortifications - as well as the 
headquarters of the powerful military religious orders 
(Crato, Avis) constitute the eternal documentation of 
those disturbed times of the fight for independence. 
They now form a countless nucleus of historic centres 
unmatched in Portugal: Marvão - World Heritage 
candidate, Castelo de Vide, Portalegre, Crato, Alter 
do Chão, Campo Maior, Elvas. Touches of 
Manueline, Renaissance and Baroque erudition's 
were added to their vernacular purity, in places, 
churches and convents, permitted by the centuries of 
the Discoveries. 
5.2 The Geographic Triangle: Portalegre - 
Castelo de Vide - Marvão 
Natural Park of Serra de S. Mamede is a very 
beautiful natural region.  
Portalegre lies on one of the sides of Serra de São 
Mamede, a mountainous range with a variety of 
fauna and flora, part of which has been designated a 
natural park. Portalegre itself is of roman origin 
though it is filled with fine Renaissance and Baroque 
mansions. Castelo de Vide, on another green slope of 
Serra de São Mamede, is known for its curative 
waters since roman times and its castle, that gave the 
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town its name. From the castle in Marvão, 
spectacularly set on an escarpment facing Serra de 
São Mamede and Spain, the splendid views can be 
enjoyed over the fertile plains. This small and 
tranquil medieval town is completely enclosed by 
walls, with whitewashed houses blending into the 
granite of the mountains. 
 
 
5.3 The Project 
On this scenario, some projects have been developed, 
some of them with considerable investments.  
“Ammaia”4 was the first golf course emerging in 
Alentejo countryside away from coastal areas. It was 
a handsome space fully integrated in the landscape of 
the Natural Park of Serra de S. Mamede.  
It was inaugurated in April 1997, being the first golf 
course in Eastern Portugal and the first one in 
Alentejo, located 5 Km from the historical village of 
Marvão (UNESCO world patrimony candidate) and 6 
Km from Castelo de Vide, also known as "Sintra of 
Alentejo". 
When it opened in 1997 offered varied infrastructure: 
areas to train, bunker and chipping areas, putting 
green, a clubhouse offering restaurant and bar 
services, manual and automatic trolleys, among other 
services. 
Landscape is fabulous in the area, allowing 
magnificent sightseeing over Marvão and S. 
Mamede’s mountain. 
                                                          
4 Ammaia is the name of a 1st century Roman city, located 
at 2 Km from the golf course, and that gave the name to the 
golf project. The Ammaia-Clube de Golfe de Marvão, S.A. 
was the owner of the project. 
This golf course has been ranked by the magazine 
"European Golf" in 1999 as the 7th most beautiful of 
Portugal (with respect to the surrounding landscape 
and insertion of the field in the landscape) and was 
distinguished as the "Golf Course of the year” by the 
Portuguese Federation of Golf,  in 2000. 
As published in the website 
http://www.portugalgolfcourses.com/portugal/golf/al
entejo/marvao.html, covering 137 hectares of the São 
Mamede Natural Park and strategically placed in the 
Marvão – Portalegre - Castelo de Vide triangle, the 
Ammaia Club de Golf of Marvão was a pioneer in the 
Alto Alentejo. As referred before, the name comes 
from an ancient Roman town that was once there, and 
which historic remains can still be seen scattered 
about the course. The welcoming clubhouse was 
inspired by the design of a typical Alentejo house, 
perfectly blending with the local landscape.  
The course5, designed by the Architect Jorge Santana 
da Silva (also responsible for the Amarante and 
Quinta da Barca courses), has undulating greens, 
several bunkers and four lakes. Three of these lakes 
are in the early part of the course (14 holes in flat 
terrain), and one in the challenging final sequence of 
four holes set in elevated countryside.  
5.4 The Project Failure 
Despite all the potentialities, Marvão golf course is 
closed since 2007 after having entered into 
insolvency proceedings, in 2006, when it belonged to 
Carlos Melancia, former Governor of Macau.  
In April 2007, through the Solévora, the Fernando 
Barata Hotel Group acquired the property of 
“Ammaia Clube de Golfe de Marvão, SA", after the 
insolvency of the company, requested by the 
Administration and decreed by court, due to debts to 
suppliers and employees.   
The same group, which had previously purchased the 
tourist village associated with the golf course, the 
"Aldeia d’Azenha", was one of the four partners of 
                                                          
5 Running to 6,170 metres, the emphasis of this course is on 
holes number 4, 12 and 17. Hole number 4, is a Par 4, 
requiring a precise drive because of water running along the 
right side of the fairway. Hole number 12, a Par 5, rises 
sharply to finish with a green made up of a double 
platform. Hole number 17, a Par 3, has a teeing-off point 
set on high ground, while its green is placed in a peninsula 
surrounded by water on three sides and exposed to the 
wind. 
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Ammaia, also integrated by Bevide, a company of 
Carlos Melancia (Ranhola, 2007). 
The company of Fernando Barata has left the project 
for breach of deadlines for payment to the 
Commission of insolvency, and lost a deposit of 
about 400 thousand euros. 
In 2009, The Edge Group, real estate fund of Miguel 
Pais do Amaral and José Luís Pinto Basto, tried to 
buy the project by 750 thousand euros. However, 
they did not reach an agreement to get the project. 
The Turismo de Portugal, for saving the golf course, 
bought it at public auction in February 2010 by 565 
thousand euros. In 2011 a group of private investors 
offered about 640 thousand euros to acquire the 
venture (Conceição, 2011). 
A new golf course is being studied for Abrunheira, 
Portalegre, when in the region of Portalegre already 
exists the above mentioned example of failure: the 
Ammaia golf course, Marvão, which current 
abandonment of land and associated buildings are 
clearly visible. Nowadays, sheep can be seen grazing 
in these areas.  
This example claims for reflection and collective 
responsibility when promoting this kind of 
investments; public institutions may better ponder the 
approval of large projects of this nature. 
5.5 The Methodological Discussion  
Taking into consideration the frameworks considered 
for the present discussion - commons and anti-
commons theories – some preliminary comments are 
appropriate: 
 There is an enormous natural scenery and 
historical heritage, claiming for being 
enjoyed and being potentially very 
significant for tourism exploitation in a 
sustainable basis, guaranteeing the space and 
legacy preservation; 
  the existing structures, the cultural features 
and the communities’ organization also 
reflect a under exploited region but with 
great potential for developing a sustainable 
tourism offer;  
 preserving all this region for sustainable 
tourism development is a central issue for 
managing the natural, built, and socio-
cultural resources of the host communities 
of the region; 
 there is no enough coordination among local 
agents themselves and with local and 
national authorities to develop integrated 
strategies of development of tourism 
products for the region; 
 There are no joint strategies, including 
integrated and diversified offers for tourism 
products, combined with price coordination 
and a net of joint actions to find chain added 
value for economic agents in the region. 
 There are not tour-operators concerned with 
a high value product for the region, 
integrating a set of activities and facilities. 
 Such a “space” needs the appropriate 
promotion to become a demanded tourism 
region. 
In short, there has not been any agents coordination 
in order to make the correct (and higher level) 
exploitation of the project, considering the existing 
tourism products in the region. 
Additionally, some other notes need to be presented, 
specifically considering the supra mentioned broken 
project. What are the reasons for the bankruptcy of 
the project "Ammaia"? Equating the various possible 
hypotheses, may it have been due to: 
 errors and incompetence of management? 
Independently for this project or considering 
other developed projects, having anyhow 
some joint focal points associated, 
particularly on management and investment?  
 connections among  politics and businesses 
that subsequently did not have developments 
in conformity?  
 problems of economies of scale in the 
regional economy?  
 a market failure as a result of the lack of 
coordination of agents to allow the success 
of the venture?  
 a wider surrounding of inabilities to get an 
association of infrastructures and other 
structures to be made available for 
supporting the local tourism projects? 
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 a strict question of communication and 
marketing that failed?  
Considering all the above statements and evidences, 
it is clear that “Ammaia” was a big investment in a 
region with no much facilities and with no tradition 
in big tourism demanding. Anyway, some facilities 
were created to support the project and a well known 
and famous hotel (in Castelo de Vide) was in the 
neighborhood supporting the project. Additionally 
new related facilities were being created. Yet, new 
investors keep interested in the project, as it is the 
case of Dr. Pais do Amaral. 
As recognized by Candela and Figini (2010) there are 
several fundamental economic problems of a 
destination, including that: 
 in the destination, it is necessary to 
coordinate the different production activities 
provided by independent firms;  
 in the destination, it is necessary to supply a 
variety of goods and services in order to 
meet tourists' needs and improve their 
satisfaction;  
 the destination needs to “complete” the 
tourism product through the supply of public 
goods (structures and infrastructures) and 
services (information) which cannot 
efficiently be offered by the private sector.  
In a region as the one approached in this study,  it is 
relevant to understand that many goods and services 
are lacked in the area and much is necessary to be 
done to have attractive tourism products.  
It seems also clear that the President of Marvão 
Municipality has been – and continues to be -  very 
committed with the project’s success. However, the 
financial resources and his power of influence is not 
enough by himself alone to open a new perspective 
for the future of the project. 
However, it seems that, considering the promoters 
and all the involved agents, the commitment was not 
significant. The coordination among municipalities’ 
authorities and among the economic agents of the 
different municipalities who were interested in the 
development of the project has not worked. Also the 
venture’s direct promoters did not develop or search 
for new solutions. 
Now, a profound analysis is requires for the future.  
While such kind of a project brings considerable 
chemical pollution to the water courses, significant in 
golf area and some other kinds of risks, which 
amount would be depending on the dimensions of the 
tourism arrivals, it is also true that a possible increase 
of investments would come and new improvements 
would be made considering the facilities in the 
region. 
At the same time, some other activities could be 
implemented in the region in order to develop 
traditional arts, to contribute for promoting the 
preservation of historical mankind resources in the 
region and the natural and other tourism landscapes. 
In practice, several activities, although constituting 
activities used by tourists, (natural, socio-cultural, 
built attractions, …), could have their maintenance 
supported and financed by tourism, providing their 
preservation and improvements. In that extent, the 
same is applicable, for example, specifically to the 
facilities serving the needs of tourists (for example, 
accommodation or specialized facilities), to other 
facilities serving both, tourists and locals, to the 
broader landscape, to the natural environmental 
elements (water, air, land, …), infrastructures, etc. 
In such kind of space, the carrying capacity of this 
area in Alentejo, in general, is far away from being 
reached and until then, many improvements for the 
region as a whole and for local population may be 
got. However, the ways to minimize the negative 
externalities may be considered, mainly the ones 
occurred in consequence of the watering and 
fertilizing system of the golf course with direct 
environmental impacts on habitats, species, soils and 
hydric resources. 
To solve the anti-commons problem as a result from 
the agents’ lack of coordination6, more coordination 
and more commitment among the agents are required.  
6. Some Conclusions and 
Recommendations  
In several countries in which tourism is a 
fundamental activity, the framework of commons and 
                                                          
6 Other kind of problems that may have contributed for the 
bankruptcy of the supra mentioned project is not considered 
in the analysis, once it is out of the purposes of the current 
study. 
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anti-commons is a possible tool to methodologically 
deal with tourism problems. 
The tourism products and destinations may request 
the modelling of optimal development strategies, 
combining the measures provided by national and 
local authorities with the ones of economic agents. 
The exploitation of the tourism products may deserve 
an analysis strong enough to allow that the tourism 
activities in a region are sustainable; that  the tourism 
resources be kept preserved; that the suitable rates of 
firms profitability and the benefits from the tourism 
for communities are  got; and the governmental aims, 
of all kinds, be kept consistent with long term 
exploitation of tourism resources. 
According to the previously exposed, governments 
have to be a part in the decision process and shall 
create the sustainable conditions for the tourism 
exploitation in the long term. When needed, they may 
be representative as a part in the solutions’ findings. 
Not always the interests of the economic agents are 
compatible. Usually being the products offered 
complementary, often there are also conflicting ones 
once they are competitive. In both circumstances, as 
much as possible, the agents may look for 
coordination in order to find acceptable results. Often 
cooperation appears as a solution and agents have to 
study the specific conditions in which they benefit 
from cooperation.  
In this study, Alto Alentejo was used to show that 
one region with important geographical, historical, 
and socio-cultural resources and an enormous natural 
beauty can develop tourism products, improving the 
welfare of the locals and providing an excellent route 
for tourists. The development of tourism can provide 
an important improvement in the region commons. 
However, the Ammaia Golf Course (Ammaia Club 
de Golf of Marvão) was a project developed in the 
region but, considering a set of reasons, fell into the 
liquidation.  
The framework of anti-commons may explain that a 
better agents coordination in the region would 
contribute to reduce the risks of collapse of such a 
kind of project. This outcome frustrated what would 
be a socially desirable outcome, considering all the 
agents involved in the project, since the entrepreneurs 
and the beneficiaries of the service, until the region 
authorities and the community. 
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